A hazard model for welfare durations with unobserved location-specific effects by J. Fitzgerald
Institute for Research on Poverty
Discussion Paper no. 1046-94
A Hazard Model for Welfare Durations





This research was undertaken while John Fitzgerald was an American Statistical Association/
NSF/Census Fellow at the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The program is supported by NSF grant SES
87-13643 and the Census Bureau. All opinions and conclusions are the author’s and do not reflect the
views of the NSF, the Census Bureau, or the Institute for Research on Poverty.Abstract
Many papers have investigated how personal characteristics and environmental variables affect
welfare durations of unmarried mothers. This paper estimates proportional hazard models for welfare
durations that allow for either fixed state or fixed labor market area effects. Conditioning on residence
location by fixed effects can limit the impact of three types of potential bias. (1) Estimates of the
effects of personal characteristics can be biased owing to the omission of relevant local area variables.
(2) Estimates of the impact of state welfare benefit levels are biased because they proxy for other
unmeasured attributes of the state, in particular, the entire state welfare system. Conditioning on state
fixed effects limits this bias to the extent that we can use time variation within states to estimate the
benefit level effect. (3) With state fixed effects, we can better estimate the impact of local conditions,
such as unemployment rates, because they also may have been picking up omitted state-level effects.
The models are estimated by the Cox partial likelihood method with time-varying covariates. Data
come from the 1984 and 1985 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. I find that
some personal characteristics (being black or Hispanic, education) have greater impact after controlling
for location-specific effects.A Hazard Model for Welfare Durations
with Unobserved Location-Specific Effects
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM
Models of welfare dynamics have generally estimated the effects on duration of welfare receipt
of personal characteristics of the recipient, state AFDC benefit levels, and some environmental
covariates such as unemployment rates. This paper estimates a proportional hazard model for welfare
durations that allows for fixed state or local labor market effects in order to provide more complete
control for state policy and environmental influences.
Conceptual models for welfare durations usually assume that a woman on AFDC chooses
between the options of staying on or getting off welfare. In these discrete choice models, a woman
chooses the current option that provides a larger present value of her expected future utility. The non-
welfare option is associated with increasing earnings (getting a job, increasing current work hours) or
marrying. The expected returns on these options can vary through time, producing a sequence of
decisions which result in welfare spells. For example, see Blank (1989).
Within this framework, the exit from AFDC would depend on the relative value of the welfare
option compared to job or marriage options. This in turn depends on (a) personal characteristics such
as the mother’s age and education (which affect her wage and job options), number and age of her
children (which affect the value of home production and cost of child care), the availability of other
income when off welfare (property income or child support); (b) policy parameters such as the benefit
level and other state welfare program characteristics; and (c) environmental variables that reflect the
job market, marriage market, and so on. Most models have depended upon the state AFDC benefit
maximum to proxy the state welfare system. Most also depend on state-level measures of
unemployment rates and environmental variables, with some using local-area measures.
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Given the limited number of state or local area variables that can be included in such models,
omitted variables are likely. A key example would be administrative practices of the state of
residence: these important practices may not be captured by the inclusion of state benefit levels alone.
Another example would be community attitudes toward welfare. This paper estimates a model of
welfare duration that allows for unobserved fixed state effects, and a separate model that allows for
unobserved fixed local effects of a labor market area (described below). Such models have the
potential to remove biases due to unobserved, time-invariant characteristics of the states or localities.
Conditioning on location via fixed effects can remove three potential biases: (1) the bias on personal
characteristics such as education level and race due to omission of local or state traits, (2) bias on the
effects of included state-level variables such as AFDC benefit levels due to omission of other state
characteristics, and (3) bias on local area variables such as unemployment rates due to omitted state
effects.
I compare three models: first, a proportional hazard model without fixed effects that includes
some local area covariates; second, the same model with fixed state effects; and third, a model with
fixed local effects of a labor market area. The models are estimated using the Cox partial likelihood
method and allow for time-varying covariates. The next section describes this model. Section III
describes the data taken from the 1984 and 1985 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). Section IV discusses the results, and Section V shows fit and sensitivity tests. A
brief conclusion follows.
Throughout the paper, the term "labor market area," or LMA, refers to an aggregate of
counties. The definition is based on work by Tolbert and Killian (1987), who divide the United States
into 382 labor market areas based on the relative strength of commuting ties among counties.
Compared to some other definitions, these LMA’s have the advantage that they exhaust all counties in3
the United States and can cross state boundaries. The LMA’s tend to look like the more familiar
SMSA’s in urban areas, but rural counties are also grouped.
II. THE FIXED EFFECT PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD MODEL
I specify a proportional hazard model where the baseline hazard includes a common fixed
effect for persons in the same location. In this section I refer to a "location-specific effect," which
could be either state-specific or specific to a labor market area. The model is estimated by Cox’s
partial likelihood method.
Both Chamberlain (1985) and Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980) discuss the possibility of using
partial likelihood to eliminate fixed effects as nuisance parameters. The development in this paper
closely follows that of Ridder and Tunali (1989, 1990), who estimate by partial likelihood a mortality
hazard for children with a fixed family-specific effect. Their model allows time-varying covariates
and formally develops the conditions under which such an approach is appropriate.




(2) h(Xij(t)) = exp(B¢Xij(tij)) and X denotes the matrix of potentially time varying covariates; B is a
vector of unknown coefficients; lj(tij,vj) is the baseline hazard in location j, which is allowed to
depend on the unobserved fixed effect vj.4
Ridder and Tunali state four conditions that ensure that the partial likelihood model with time-
varying covariates is appropriate. These are met in my context where we have independent spells by
women grouped by location. Condition 1 is independent failure rates—there is no interaction between
exit rates by women in the same location, conditional on covariates. Condition 2 states that the
covariates are exogenous. I tried to select largely exogenous covariates (age, race, ethnicity, education,
other income, age and number of children), although it might be argued that children and education
are choice variables.
2 Condition 3 states that the censoring process is independent of the welfare exit
process. This clearly holds for spells censored by the end of the panel, but is more questionable for
sample attriters. Fitzgerald and Zuo (1991) suggest that attrition may not be a problem for models of
welfare spells in SIPP. Condition 4 is that the (conditional) exit rates for a location do not depend on
the number of women (spells) in that location. The last assumption is necessary to avoid bias because
the estimation is restricted to locations that include two or more spells.
The intuition behind likelihood construction for the partial likelihood model is straightforward.
Each person (spell) contributes a piece to the overall likelihood that answers the following question:
Given that an exit occurred at time S, what is the probability that the exit occurs by the actual case
with length S rather than any of the other cases that are still at risk at time S?
In notation, let ij be the risk set for person (spell) i in location j. This is the set of all persons
who live in j who have not exited prior to tij (including censored cases). The contribution of an




Everything is measured at tij, the spell length for person i. Note that the underlying hazard lj has
canceled out, along with its implicit fixed effect vj. In essence, the risk set for a person includes only
those in her location, and the estimation makes comparisons only among those who live in location j.
The likelihood for the whole sample is
(6)
where Li(B) is from (3).
I maximize the log likelihood:
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(7)
A word should be said about the use of time-varying covariates. I assumed that the proper
way to line up the covariates across persons was by elapsed time in spell. Thus for the likelihood
contribution by person i with spell length tij, the risk set uses covariates from elapsed time in spell tij
for all persons in the risk set. For example, if person i’s spell has length 3 then the risk set uses
covariates for the third month of each spell.
III. DATA AND VARIABLES
A. SIPP
My data come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal
sample of households representing the noninstitutionalized population of the United States. It includes
monthly information on income, use of government programs, labor force participation, and
demographic characteristics. Interviews are conducted every four months asking about activity in the
previous four months. Each year a new panel is introduced. Each panel potentially gives 32 months
of data collected from eight interviews.
4 I worked with the 1984 and 1985 Longitudinal Research
Files (Panels) which have been longitudinally edited for consistency (SIPP, 1989, pp. B-1 to B-19).
The 1984 panel includes about 20,000 households and spans June 1983 to March 1986.
5 The 1985
panel includes about 15,000 households and spans October 1984 to July 1987. For more details on
SIPP, see Nelson, McMillen, and Kasprzyk (1985).
B. Welfare Recipiency7
I began with a subsample of unmarried women with children (female heads of families) who
received welfare at any time during a panel. This group was chosen because female heads are of
primary policy interest, and because the welfare data on this group may be more reliable.
6 A woman
is coded as a recipient if she reports receiving either AFDC or General Assistance. This definition
includes women who misreport their AFDC receipt as General Assistance, a known problem (Marquis
and Moore, 1989). Based on earlier work and an administrative data check, this definition more
accurately identifies the AFDC population of female heads in SIPP than using AFDC receipt alone.
7
A spell of welfare receipt is defined as the length of time that a woman continuously receives
welfare income (AFDC or General Assistance). One month gaps of nonreceipt were ignored to produce
a continuous spell over the gap. A spell can occur at any time during a panel. To avoid econometric
difficulties in working with left-censored spells, I used only complete and right-censored spells. Thus
my spells are those of new entrants, that is, the first observed (complete or right-censored) spell of
receipt.
Persons who miss interviews during the panel or refuse to answer specific items may have data
imputed to them. All imputed recipiency data are treated as missing in the analysis. Persons who
missed interviews were considered censored at that interview.
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C. Variables
Table 1 displays the means and definitions of the variables. Most are self explanatory.
Local area unemployment is used to capture the strength of the local labor market, and local
area sex ratio is used to crudely proxy marriage prospects. These variables were matched to SIPP
individuals using county-of-residence information available on internal Census files.
9 The LMA
variables are weighted averages of the counties within the LMA.
10 The unemployment data,
LUNEM, are annual rates (1983-87) computed for the LMA based on county-level data from the8
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The county data on LMA Sexratio (LSEXRT) came from the 1988 City
County Data Book.
A few notes are in order. The urban residence dummy, URBAN, indicates residence in a large
SMSA (population greater than 250,000). One expects that welfare use is more common, hence less
stigmatized, in the anonymity of larger urban areas. Other income was included to show outside
income possibilities such as child support; I included it as a dummy variable because including it as a
linear continuous variable always produced a small coefficient with a large standard error. State
welfare program information came from the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and
Means (1987). As is commonly done, I used the maximum benefit level for a family of four,
AFDCMAX, as the benefit measure.
11 I control for family size through number of children, NKID.
A dummy for having children aged less than 6, YKID, reflects increased value of home time and
increased cost of child care if working. The median welfare duration of 11-12 months shown in Table
1 agrees with Ruggles (1989) and Long and Doyle (1989).
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TABLE 1
Definition, Mean, and Standard Deviation of Variables for Spells
Variable Name Definition Mean Std Dev
AGE (at spell beginning) 28.7 9.21
BLACK (dummy=1i fblack) 0.36 0.48
HISP (dummy=1i fHispanic) 0.12 0.33
EDU (years of education completed) 10.76 2.42
NKIDS (total children aged 18 or younger) 1.79 1.05
YKID (dummy = 1 for children below 6) 0.67 0.47
OTHDUM (dummy = 1 for positive property
income, child support or alimony) 0.13 0.34
URBAN (dummy =1 if live in SMSA with
population more than 250,000) 0.61 0.48
LSEXRT (LMA male per 100 female) 94.53 3.58
LUNEM (LMA unemployment rate) 8.07 2.77
AFDCMAX (AFDC benefit for family of four,
in $100’s) 4.16 1.48
P84 (dummy=1i ffrom 1984 panel data) 0.65 0.47




Note: First observed spell from pooled 1984 and 1985 panels of SIPP. Welfare recipiency is either
AFDC or General Assistance.
aMedian Duration from estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor function.9
IV. RESULTS
The partial likelihood estimates are shown in Table 2. The first column shows coefficients for
the model without fixed effects. The second shows the exponentiated coefficient, which helps interpret
the size of the coefficient. In a proportional hazard model, the exponentiated coefficient shows the
proportional change in the hazard for a one-unit change in the covariate. For example, the hazard for
blacks is only .71 as high as for non-blacks.
In addition to race, Hispanic origin, number of children, and presence of young children all
have substantial, negative coefficients. AFDC benefits have a well-estimated, moderate-sized effect
(recall that its units are $100). The local variables have moderate-sized, fairly well estimated
coefficients. For example, a one percent rise in LUNEM lowers the hazard by 4 percent. Thus
persons in labor market areas with unemployment that is 2.38 percent above the mean LUNEM (one
standard deviation above) would have about 10 percent lower hazards.
The second model includes no fixed effects and only 9 coefficients. It is included for
comparison to the local fixed-effect model below.
Before turning to the fixed-effect results, let me briefly discuss whether we expect coefficients
to become larger or smaller in absolute value after conditioning on the location effects. A simple
omitted-variable interpretation would suggest that conditioning on location would attenuate coefficients
on variables such as benefit levels because low-benefit states may be those that have tougher
administration that would also give rise to shorter spells. But there is another effect that complicates.
Ridder and Verbakel (1984) show that unobserved heterogeneity uncorrelated with covariates biases10
TABLE 2
Partial Likelihood Estimates of Proportional Hazard Model of Welfare Duration
No Fixed Effect No Fixed Effect State Fixed Effect Local Fixed Effect
11 coeff. 9 coeff. 11 coeff. 9 coeff.
Variable Coeff. Exp (Coeff) Coeff. Exp (Coeff) Coeff. Exp (Coeff) Coeff. Exp (Coeff)
Age .00582 1.01 .00429 1.00 .00825 1.01 .0145 1.01
(.00894) (.00887) (.00973) (.0123)
Black -.343** .71 -.406*** .67 -.414*** .67 -.563*** .57
(.139) (.137) (.172) (.222)
Hispanic -.318 .73 -.376* .69 -.444* .64 -.420 .66
(.222) (.221) (.262) (.306)
Education .0470 1.05 .0446 1.05 .0437 1.04 .0897** 1.09
.0293 (.029) (.0330) (.0404)
Number of Kids -.136** .87 -.127* .88 -.106 .90 -.133 .88
(.0656) (.065) (.0719) (.0890)
Presence of -.253 .78 -.234 .79 -.242 .79 -.149 .86
Kids (.161) (.160) (.179) (.221)
Other Income -.0385 .96 -.0182 .98 .0109 1.01 -.0490 .95
Dummy (.191) (.190) (.216) (.277)
ADFCmax -.121*** .89 -.135*** .87 -.464 .63 -.384 .68
(.0490) (.0470) (.549) (.389)
(table continues)11
TABLE 2, continued
No Fixed Effect No Fixed Effect State Fixed Effect Local Fixed Effect
11 coeff. 9 coeff. 11 coeff. 9 coeff.
Variable Coeff. Exp (Coeff) Coeff. Exp (Coeff) Coeff. Exp (Coeff) Coeff. Exp (Coeff)
Urban -.319*** .73 -.305* .74
(.136) (.182)
LMA -.0458* .96 -.0296 .98 -.00636 .99 -.00323 1.00
Unemployment (.0246) (.0241) (.0378) (.0110)
LMA Sexratio .0300* 1.03 .0566* 1.06
(.0192) (.0329)




Fixed Locations 38 88
Log Likelihood -1482 -1487 -579.8 -290.9
c
2 Test for No
Fixed Effect 8.23 (11 d.f.) 8.79 (9 d.f.)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample of unmarried mothers from 1984–1985 panels of SIPP. Asterisks indicate that coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), or 2 percent (***) levels.12
coefficients toward zero in proportional hazard models. Conditioning on the fixed effect removes
some heterogeneity and thus the coefficients should become larger in absolute value.
The results for the model with fixed state effects are shown in the third pair of columns. My
results tend to show the latter effect mentioned above. The coefficients on black and Hispanic are
larger in magnitude; conditioning on state of residence, blacks and Hispanics have longer spells. The
coefficient on AFDC benefits also becomes larger in size, but the standard error becomes relatively
larger. This coefficient is estimated using only the within-state variation over time in benefit levels;
when real benefits rise over time, those within a state will stay on welfare longer. There is apparently
not enough variation over the years 1983 to 1987 to get a precise estimate. But the coefficient on
unemployment is near zero, and poorly estimated; our labor market area unemployment rates may not
vary enough within states to get more precision. Another way of saying this is that a state’s economic
condition may be fairly homogeneous over the time span analyzed. The coefficient on sex ratio
becomes larger in size, conditioning on state. Overall, the qualitative results are similar to the model
with no fixed effects.
More formally, one can test whether the state fixed effects are significant. The test statistic is
based on the difference between the coefficient vector with and without fixed effects weighted by the
appropriate variance matrix.
13 Ridder and Tunali (1990) derive this Hausman-type statistic and show
that it has a Chi-squared distribution. The statistic for state fixed effect, shown at the bottom of Table
2, has a value of 8.23, which indicates that fixed effects are not statistically significant at usual
significance levels. This suggests that the coefficients in the models, as a group, are not very
different. Thus the results without fixed effects are not misleading.
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The last two columns show the model with fixed labor market effects, that is, using only
variation within labor market areas. This removes further heterogeneity and the coefficients again
generally rise in absolute value, especially for personal characteristics. Black continues to have a13
well-estimated coefficient and shows an even larger negative effect on exits. Hispanic origin continues
to have the large effect that it had in the fixed state-effect model. The coefficient on education
doubles and is well estimated. Within a labor market, higher education levels have a big impact,
larger than in previous studies. AFDC benefits again have a larger coefficient than without fixed
effects, but it is poorly estimated, most likely owing to lack of variation. The LUNEM coefficient is
poorly estimated, again probably owing to lack of variation. The remaining coefficients change little.
The c
2 test for no fixed effects is shown at the bottom of the table, and is again not significant (at
5%).
Overall, the effects of race and ethnicity are very important after conditioning on labor market
area. One might have suspected that conditioning more fully on local environmental characteristics by
fixed effects would have reduced the black/white difference in exit rates--since black areas tend to
have less robust labor markets--but this is apparently overbalanced by the rise in the size of the
coefficients due to the reduction in heterogeneity. Generally, personal characteristics are more
important when one controls for location heterogeneity.
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V. ROBUSTNESS AND FIT
To evaluate the fit of the models, I used plots of the generalized residuals as described by
Lawless (1982, pp. 365–366).
16 The underlying hazard from the proportional hazard model can be
recovered, and one can form an estimate of the integrated hazard, say ˆ H0(t). A generalized residual
ˆ ei = ˆ H0(t)exp(B¢xi) can be formed for each spell. In the absence of censoring, the ei’s should look like
a random sample from the unit exponential distribution. In the presence of censoring, one constructs a
set of censored residuals and uncensored residuals. These can be combined to estimate a (product-
limit) survivor function. This survivor function should be consistent with the underlying unit
exponential.14
Figure 1 shows the log of the survivor function from the residuals plotted against the value of
the residual. If the proportional hazard model is adequate, the residuals shown fall along a straight
line with slope -1 that corresponds to the unit exponential. The plots do not show large departures.
There appears to be growing departure at high values of residuals, but we must remember that the
sampling error grows as we move out along the axis as well. Overall, I conclude that there is not
evidence from this test of a bad fit for the proportional hazard model.
To check sensitivity, I ran a discrete-time proportional hazard model as developed by Prentice
and Gloeckler (1978) (without fixed effects) for comparison to the assumed continuous-time model.
This discrete specification is developed by integrating a continuous-time proportional hazard model
into discrete intervals. The model is explained in the appendix. It allows a stepwise hazard that is
very flexible. Since it is discrete, it handles ties in the spell length in a natural way and provides a
check on my treatment of ties in the continuous-time models of the last section.
17 Table 3 shows the
results. The coefficients and standard errors are in close agreement with the no-fixed-effect model of
Table 2, confirming that my assumption of a continuous-time model in Table 2 is not misleading.
The second check allows for heterogeneity in the discrete model. I estimated the discrete
hazard model, without fixed effects, allowing for an individual specific heterogeneity component to
multiply the proportional hazard. I followed the approach of Meyer (1988), who develops the
likelihood for this model. The likelihood is formed by conditioning on the individual component and
then integrating it out over its assumed distribution, taken to be gamma. (See the Appendix for
details.) To the extent heterogeneity is important, not correcting for heterogeneity produces an
underlying hazard that overestimates the true state dependence due to welfare use (e.g., Lancaster,
1979). In this model, I found that the variance of the gamma distribution tends to zero, indicating
little unmeasured heterogeneity. The estimate of sigma has a large standard error, and we cannot
reject that sigma equals zero. The estimated coefficients from this model are extremely close to those15
FIGURE 116
TABLE 3
Discrete Hazard for Welfare Duration: Complementary Log-Log Specification
with No Local-Specific Fixed Effects
Complementary Log-Log











Number of Kids -.141** -.178***
(.0656) (.0676)
Presence of Child < 6 -.261 -.243
(.161) (.158)






LMA Unemployment -.0480* -.0465*
(.0246) (.0254)
LMA Sexratio .0308* -.0302
(.0192) (.195)





Variable Complementary Log-Log with Gamma Heterogeneity
T3 (9-12 months) -.486*** -.484***
(.189) (.186)
T4 (13-16 months) -1.10*** -1.081***
(.302) (.298)
T5 (17-20 months) -.734** -.717**
(.328) (.326)




Sample Size (Persons) 533 533
Log Likelihood -980.6 -978.9
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample of unmarried mothers from 1984, 1985 panels of
SIPP. Asterisks indicate that coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5
percent (**), or 1 percent (***) level.18
from the model assuming zero heterogeneity. This is consistent with work cited by Meyer (1988) that
heterogeneity is generally not important when one allows a very flexible functional form for the
underlying hazard.
VI. CONCLUSION
The results establish that personal characteristics are important determinants of welfare
durations even after one controls for location by fixed effects. In particular, with labor market area
fixed effects, being black or Hispanic continues to result in lower welfare exit hazards. Thus the race
variable is not simply picking up bad labor market attributes. Education has a large positive effect on
exit rates even among those who live in the same labor market area. The biases on personal
characteristics due to omission of fixed state or local effects appears to be limited to the characteristics
of race and ethnicity and education; other coefficients on age, number of children, presence of young
children, and other income show little change when fixed effects are added.
AFDC benefits may have a larger effect after controlling for the fixed effects, but the standard
errors for AFDC benefits in the fixed-effect models are so large that they inspire little confidence.
Measured local area variables have moderate impacts without fixed effects. Conditional on state fixed
effects, unemployment rates have a small and poorly estimated effect, most likely due to lack of
variation within states. Local sex ratios have a larger positive effect on exits after controlling for
state-level effects. Both AFDC benefit and measured local area effects suffer from lack of within-state
variation, which could potentially be solved by data with more time variation. A final problem is that
the geographic area used for local measures, the LMA, may be too large an aggregate to accurately
measure local influences. Nevertheless, by virtue of its definition, it is the appropriate level of
aggregation for judging labor market strength.19
Overall, the data suggest that standard estimates of the effects of some personal characteristics
(race, Hispanicity, education) are biased owing to unmeasured state or local effects. Other personal
traits are not biased. AFDC benefit levels may have a larger impact once one controls for other
unmeasured state effects, but the data are not strong enough on this point to say more. Even though
the fixed-effects technique did not produce strikingly different results in this application, it offers an
improved way of dealing with state or local heterogeneity in policy evaluations.2021
Appendix
Discrete Hazard Model and Heterogeneity
This appendix describes a complementary log-log form of discrete hazard. Assume the
underlying continuous hazard has a proportional hazards form li(t)=l0(t)exp(B¢Xi(t)) with baseline
hazard l0(t). If the data are discrete, then exit probabilities for each interval can be computed by
integrating li(t) over each interval. This is the approach of Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). See
discussion in Allison (1982) or Meyer (1988).
The discrete hazard becomes
P(t) = 1−exp(−exp(a(t)+B¢X(t)) = 1−exp(-h(t))
where h(t) = exp(a(t)+B¢X(t)) and a(t) represents the baseline hazard as a piecewise linear
function, which allows flexibility.




The text also presents results that allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Meyer (1988) extends
the discrete hazard model to include heterogeneity, and I adopt his method. He argues that once one
adopts a flexible semi-parametric baseline hazard, the exact choice of a parametric distribution for the
heterogeneity may not matter. I use a flexible hazard similar to Meyer’s and a parametric distribution
for heterogeneity.
Assume that heterogeneity affects the underlying hazard multiplicatively:
where qi is a draw from some distribution F(qi), assumed independent of Xi(t) and the censoring
mechanism. The log likelihood is obtained by conditioning on the unobservable qi and then
integrating it out over its distribution. Meyer shows that the resulting log likelihood is
(2)
Meyer makes the usual convenient assumption that q has a gamma distribution with mean one
and variance s
2. In this case, the integration can be done in closed form yielding the log likelihood
(3)2324
Endnotes
1Examples using state-level variables include Bane and Ellwood (1983), Ellwood (1986), O’Neill,
Bassi, and Wolf (1987), Ruggles (1989), Long and Doyle (1989), or Fitzgerald (1991). Two papers
use local-area variables measured below the state level. Blank (1989) uses SMSA unemployment rates
in her work with SIME/DIME data, but, accordingly, she has data only from Seattle and Denver.
Fitzgerald (1994) uses nationwide data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation linked to
county and labor-market-area data on environmental variables.
2This does not cause a problem unless these decisions are made jointly with the welfare
participation decision.
3The estimation is performed using Newton-Raphson iterations in GAUSS software. The standard
errors are computed from the inverse of the estimated Hessian. Consistency of the estimators can be
justified by two asymptotic arguments. Chamberlain (1985, p. 24) cites Cox’s argument for the case
of multiple spells per individual where the asymptotics depend on the number of spells per person
increasing. In my context this corresponds to the number of persons per location increasing, which a
larger SIPP sample would provide. When dealing with labor market areas, my sample actually has
relatively more locations than persons per location. This corresponds to Ridder and Tunali (1990) who
prove consistency in a child mortality model with family fixed effects as the number of families
increase.
4Half of the 1984 panel was interviewed nine times, and half eight, with 15 percent of the sample
cut at interviews 5 and 6. The longitudinal research files contain information from eight interviews.
5The SIPP uses a rotating, staggered interview design whereby one-fourth of the sample is
interviewed each month. Thus the calendar time span of the panel exceeds 32 months, but not all
persons are interviewed at the ends.25
6Problems with misreporting of recipiency have been documented by Coder and Ruggles (1988)
and others. SIPP includes many married couples on AFDC with earnings in states where they would
ordinarily be ineligible. Further, many men report receiving AFDC who would also be ineligible. To
guard against misreporting, consistency checks were performed to ensure that a sample woman was
categorically AFDC eligible, i.e., unmarried and a parent or guardian. To prevent timing of reported
events within a spell to cause me to drop spells on this account, I allowed one month of slippage
within a spell where a woman could report marriage or no children.
7I reason that unmarried women with children who report receiving General Assistance are most
likely receiving AFDC. An administrative record check supports this assumption. Kent Marquis and
Jeff Moore of the Census Bureau kindly prepared an analysis comparing recorded receipt of AFDC
from state administrative records for a four-state convenience sample, to reported receipt of (a) AFDC
alone and (b) AFDC or General Assistance. To the extent possible the analysis worked with
unmarried adult women with children in their households. Under definition (b), the analysis showed a
large drop in false reports of non-receipt, where SIPP showed no AFDC receipt and the "true"
recipiency from administrative records showed receipt, from 35 percent to 5 percent. Definition (b)
does lead to a slight rise in false reports of receipt (to 6 percent from 3 percent), but this does not
outbalance the former error reduction.
8Work by Fitzgerald and Zuo (1991) suggests that results using imputed data would be quite
similar.
9I had access to internal files because I was a Census employee while participating in the
ASA/NSF/Census Fellowship program.
10If a county had a missing data item, data from the remaining counties within the LMA were used
to get LMA values.26
11While it might be more accurate to use the benefit adjusted by family size, this would add some
endogeneity to the benefit measure since family size could potentially depend on the benefit level.
12An earlier paper, Fitzgerald (1991), obtained a longer median length of 20 months for two
reasons: (1) the earlier work coded out up to three-month gaps while the current sample codes out only
one-month gaps, and (2) the earlier work did not include reported General Assistance cases, which
tend to have shorter spells, while this paper includes such cases. The hazard models for the two
samples are very similar.
13The statistic is defined as
where Bs is the coefficient vector from the "stratified" model with fixed effects, and Bu is the
coefficient vector for the "unstratified" model with no fixed effects. Ridder and Tunali (1990, pp.
23–25) prove that the variance matrix can be computed simply as
where the right-hand-side terms are the estimated variance/covariance matrices from the separate
estimations. The statistic T is shown to be distributed (p) where p is the number of coefficients in
the model.
14Ridder and Tunali do not investigate the power of their test. In their own example, they get a
significant test statistic only after dropping statistically insignificant variables from their model. They
state (1990, p.27) that these variables adversely affect the power of their test.27
15I investigated one other possible explanation. As mentioned earlier, a location must have at least
2 spells, 1 complete, to contribute to the likelihood. As we move from the fixed-effect model to that
of the LMA fixed effect, we lose some sample spells. To check that this was not biasing my results
(in violation of condition 4 from Section II), I ran the no-fixed-effect model on the smaller sample that
contributes to the LMA model. The smaller sample tends to be more urban and more black. I found
that the coefficient on black became somewhat smaller in absolute value for the restricted sample.
Thus the variation in sample does not explain why the coefficient on black is bigger for the fixed
effect LMA model. That is, holding sample constant, there is even a larger difference between the no-
fixed-effect and LMA fixed-effect models.
16Residual tests are described in many sources. For example, see Lancaster (1990, Ch. 11).
17In the previous estimations, ties were handled by allowing each tied observation to contribute to
the likelihood as if it were a single observation. This is essentially Peto’s approximation (Kalbfleish
and Prentice, 1980, p. 74).28
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